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The fall and rise of the
global economy
Anyone who follows the news, even
casually, or reads product labels, is
aware that the world economy has
become more interdependent in re-
cent decades. Indeed, the worldwide
integration of national economies—
through goods and services trade,
capital flows, and operational linkages
among firms—has never before been
as broad or as deep.1
Nevertheless, the course of globaliza-
tion has not always been smooth. At
the start of the 20th century, the global
economy was highly integrated. In
some regards, it was nearly as integrat-
ed as it is today. Yet two decades later,
a noteworthy commentator lamented
the apparent end of this economic
integration. John Maynard Keynes
wrote an eloquent and oft-cited de-
scription of the pre-World War I
economy:2
What an extraordinary episode in
the economic progress of man that
age was which came to an end in
August, 1914! ... life offered, at a
low cost and with the least trouble,
conveniences, comforts, and amen-
ities beyond the compass of the
richest and most powerful monarchs
of other ages. The inhabitant of
London could order by telephone,
sipping his morning tea in bed, the
various products of the whole
earth ... he could at the same mo-
ment and by the same means ad-
venture his wealth in the natural
resources and new enterprises of
any quarter of the world. ... But,
most important of all, he regarded
this state of affairs as normal, cer-
tain, and permanent, except in the
direction of further improvement,
and any deviation from it as aber-
rant, scandalous, and avoidable.
In the decades that followed, two
world wars, the Great Depression,
and protectionist poli-
cies seemed to bring
economic integration
to an end. Since then,
however, advances in
technology and changes
in policy have worked
to reopen borders. De-
spite Keynes’ character-
ization of the pre-World
War I period as an “ex-
traordinary episode,”
the economic globaliza-
tion and buoyancy of
that period was not an
aberration. Rather, it
was the 1913–50 period
that stands out for its
uncharacteristically
weak growth in both output and trade.
After 1950, the world economy re-
sumed its trend toward globaliza-
tion. But it took time to make up the
ground lost: In the U.S. and elsewhere,
the level of trade relative to output
has consistently exceeded early 20th
century levels only in the past few de-
cades. Indeed, just a few years ago,
academic papers debated whether
the world economy in the 1980s and
early 1990s was more, or less, integrat-
ed than it was in 1900.3
This Chicago Fed Letter reviews the ebbs
and flows of globalization during the
past century, and argues that a con-
tinuing commitment to open mar-
kets is worth pursuing as a way to
raise living standards both at home
and abroad.
Growing importance of trade and
capital flows in the U.S.
Trade and, to a much lesser extent,
investment links were well established
a century or more ago, but both de-
teriorated during the interwar period.
Today, global economic ties have
rebounded and are generally more ex-
tensive and intensive than ever before.
Figure 1 illustrates the historical ebb
and flow of U.S. trade. Except briefly
around the time of each world war,
the ratio of trade (exports plus im-
ports) to gross national product (GNP)
did not return to turn-of-the-century
levels until the 1970s. Recently, how-
ever, this ratio has approached 25%,
its highest point in at least a century.
During much of the 19th and early
20th centuries, the U.S. participated
actively in a generally vibrant world
trade.4 Internationally, there were few
nontariff trade barriers. The interwar
period that followed, however, was
largely one of rising tariff and nontariff
barriers—in the U.S. and elsewhere—
and global disintegration rather than
integration. Since World War II, tech-
nological developments and the grad-
ual liberalization of international
trade and capital flows have put inte-
gration on the upswing.
Some of this rising trade can be attrib-
uted to “two-way” intra-industry trade.
Anecdotal evidence and recent studies
document how production processespercent of GNP
Note: Outflows of U.S. capital are the net increase in U.S.-owned assets
abroad. Inflows of foreign capital are the net increase in foreign-owned
assets in the United States.
Sources: Data from 1923 to 1959 are from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 1975, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Washington. Data from 1960 to 1999 are from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, various years.











have been increasingly divided up
and reallocated, either domestically
or globally.5 Tasks, such as research
and development, design, assembly,
and packaging, are performed by
firms in the U.S. and elsewhere, based
on countries’ relative strengths in
completing them. Consider the com-
puter industry. According to a recent
report, in 1998 an estimated 43% of
domestic producers’ total shipments
was exported, and an estimated 58%
of final and intermediate domestic
consumption was imported; some
60%, by value, of the hardware in a
typical U.S. personal computer system
comes from Asia.6
Cross-border capital flows have like-
wise grown to unprecedented levels,
reflecting reduced barriers to capital,
an increased desire of investors to di-
versify their portfolios internationally,
and a plethora of new financial instru-
ments and technologies.7 One survey
reports that average daily turnover on
world foreign exchange markets rose
from $0.6 trillion in April 1989 to
about $1.5 trillion in April 1998.8
Official balance of payments data pro-
vide a measure of capital flows that,
roughly speaking, measure the change
in cross-border ownership claims. Fig-
ure 2 shows data on inflows of capital
to the U.S. by foreigners and outflows
of capital sent abroad by U.S. residents.
Although U.S. outflows abroad have
been rising, foreign inflows have been
rising even faster. These cross-border
flows typically were no more than 1%
of GNP through the 1960s. By con-
trast, from 1995 through 1998, in-
flows averaged 7% of GNP.
Role of technology and policy
The forces driving globalization in-
clude technology and policy. Techno-
logical improvements have reduced
the costs of doing business internation-
ally; they have also created opportuni-
ties for new kinds of commercial
transactions, particularly in financial
markets and online. At the same time,
policy has worked actively to open
markets around the world. Together,
technology and policy have helped to
lower barriers to trade and investment.
Improved transportation technolo-
gies have reduced the cost of moving
products. For example, the advent of
containerization in land- and sea-based
shipping has reduced both handling
requirements and transit time for de-
liveries.9 In addition, air transport has
become more economical. Worldwide,
the cost of air freight, measured as
average revenue per ton-kilometer,
dropped by 78% between 1955 and
1996.10 At the same time, the share of
world trade in high-value-to-weight
products such as pharmaceuticals has
risen. Reflecting the
falling cost of air
freight as well as the
shifting composition
of trade, air shipments
in 1998 accounted for
28% of the value of U.S.
international trade—
up from 7% in 1965







larly trade in services.
In 1930, a three-minute
phone call from New
York to London cost
$293, measured in 1998
dollars.12 By 1998, one widely sub-
scribed discount plan charged only 36
cents for a clearer, more reliable three-
minute call.13 Firms’ ability to pro-
vide customer support by telephone
or e-mail at relatively low cost, or to
transmit digital products electroni-
cally via the Internet, has reduced
the importance of market proximity
in some industries.
Improved communications and in-
formation technologies have also un-
derpinned rapid financial market
developments. The range of financial
instruments has exploded in recent
years, contributing to the massive
gross flows of financial capital dis-
cussed earlier. For example, advances
in computing technology enable
traders to implement complex analyti-
cal models. This in turn allows finan-
cial firms to meet demand for new
financial instruments, such as swaps,
options, and futures, which allow
market participants to better manage
their risk.
Given the economic and technological
forces behind globalization, its rise
may seem inevitable. Yet governments
have taken on a critically important
role in opening markets and remov-
ing distortions, thereby allowing mar-
ket forces to play themselves out. In
contrast, policy during the interwar
period actively promoted protection-
ism through high tariff and nontariff
barriers.14 Indeed, rising protectionism
in a number of countries—including
the U.S. through the Tariff Act of
1930 (Smoot–Hawley)—made the
Great Depression more severe. Despite
U.S. efforts to begin reducing tariffs
at home and abroad in 1934, through
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act, world tariffs remained high on
average.
For the past half century, in contrast,
policy has worked actively to remove
barriers and distortions to the market
forces underpinning trade and in-
vestment. For example, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and,
more recently, the World Trade Or-
ganization have championed trade
liberalization. Since the 1970s, most
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most controls on international capi-
tal movements, and many developing
countries have greatly relaxed theirs.
Globalization and living standards
Economists generally argue that open-
ness to the world makes us more
prosperous. The freedom of firms to
choose from a wider range of inputs,
and of consumers to choose from a
wider range of products, improves
efficiency, promotes innovation, en-
courages the transfer of technology,
and otherwise enhances productivity
growth. Through trade, countries
can shift resources into those sectors
best able to compete internationally,
so reaping the benefits of specializa-
tion and scale economies. Countries
on both sides of a transaction stand
to gain.
Some, but not all, of the benefits of
market opening are quantifiable. For
example, recent studies that evaluate
trade liberalizing measures under the
Uruguay Round of multilateral nego-
tiations, completed in 1994, tend to
focus on the effects of reducing tariffs
and export subsidies and eliminating
quotas. These studies, which capture
only a narrow range of the possible
gains, find that annual global income
could rise on the order of $200 bil-
lion, measured in 1992 dollars.15
Opening domestic markets to global
capital can also improve living stan-
dards. Global capital markets allow
investors to allocate their resources
where the returns are highest and to
diversify their portfolios, thereby re-
ducing their risk. At the same time,
countries receiving capital inflows
can develop more quickly, since the
inflows allow them to increase their
productive capital stock without fore-
going current consumption. When
the capital inflow takes the form of
foreign direct investment, the inflow
often improves access to international
best practices in production, including
managerial, technical, and marketing
know-how. Therefore, global invest-
ment, like trade, benefits both sides
of the transaction. These benefits, in
turn, can lead to higher real incomes
and wages.
Of course, economic globalization is
not an end in itself, but rather a
means to raise living standards. Like
other sources of economic growth,
including technological progress,
economic integration involves natu-
ral tradeoffs. The same processes
that bring about economic growth
can force costly adjustments for
some firms and their workers. In-
creased trade re-sorts each country’s
resources, directing them toward
their most productive uses, but
some industries and their workers
may face sharp competition from
other countries. Overall, however,
economists generally attribute only
a small share of worker dislocation
in the U.S. to trade, roughly 10%
or less.16 (Such challenges may, of
course, be greater in some other
countries, particularly those where
entrenched cultural and institutional
barriers restrict the mobility of work-
ers.) Nevertheless, crafting sound
domestic policy to help ease the tran-
sition for those affected poses a sig-
nificant challenge.
The emphasis here on domestic poli-
cy is intentional. Even in an increas-
ingly global economy each nation
largely controls its own destiny. Sound
domestic policy plays an important
role in ensuring that the benefits of
international economic integration
are shared widely, raising living stan-
dards within and across the countries
that take part. In large measure, ac-
tive participation in international
markets for goods, services, and capi-
tal strengthens the case for domestic
policies that make sense even with-
out integration. Among these are
policies that encourage a flexible
and skilled work force, provide an
adequate social safety net, reward
innovation, and secure the integrity
and depth of the financial system.
Conclusion
For centuries, rising prosperity and
rising integration of the global econ-
omy have gone hand in hand. The
U.S. and much of the rest of the
world have never before been as
affluent as today. Nor has economic
globalization—the worldwide integra-
tion of national economies through
trade, capital flows, and operational
linkages among firms—ever before
been as broad or as deep. Keynes’ de-
scription of London at the beginning
of the 20th century rings even truer
for the United States and many other
countries today. This conjuncture of
rising wealth and expanding interna-
tional ties is no coincidence. The U.S.
has gained enormously from these
linkages. Indeed, future improvements
in Americans’ living standards depend
in part on our continued willingness
to embrace international economic
integration.
Over the long term, increasing our
standard of living in the U.S. requires
that Americans embrace change. It is
clearly in our interest to forge ahead,
both promoting and guiding the pro-
cess of international economic integra-
tion. Yet even as we actively promote
and encourage global economic link-
ages, we must confront the very real
challenges that arise from economic
globalization. We must find ways to
share its benefits as widely as possible.
The key lies in maintaining an econo-
my that is sufficiently flexible and
vibrant to meet the challenges of
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